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A TALE OF TWO HARBORS

The Maine
Shore and the
Army Corps:
A Tale of Two Harbors,
Wells and Saco, Maine

By discussing the problems of beach erosion and sand
movement at Wells and Saco, Joseph Kelley and Walter
Anderson demonstrate how single-minded, engineering
approaches to complex, interdisciplinary coastal issues can
create bigger problems than previously existed. As Kelley
and Anderson explain, at both Wells and Camp Ellis, the

by Joseph T. Kelley

Army Corps of Engineers was brought in to construct a

Walter A. Anderson

harbor at no local cost to the community. This was accomplished by constructing jetties, and the result has been a
persistent and serious problem of beach erosion. Over the
years, the army has offered further technical solutions that
have served only to exacerbate the problem. In pointing
out the shortcomings of these solutions, Kelley and
Anderson call for new action requiring federal, state, and
local involvement. To do nothing, they argue, is to absorb
the costs of letting nature run its course.
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INTRODUCTION

or more than a century a conflict has been developing on the Maine coast. As the level of the ocean
has risen, numerous beachfront properties have been
lost, and thousands remain in danger (Kelley et al.,
1989). At the same time, historic engineering structures, initially built to improve commercial navigation,
are altering the natural location and movement of sand
along some of our beaches. In discussing the recent
histories of Wells Harbor and Beach and Camp Ellis
Harbor and Beach, it is not our intention to discredit
individuals within the United States Army Corps of
Engineers, because the problems are, in part, of our
own making. Rather, it is our intention to demonstrate
how the single-minded, engineering approach of the
army to complex, interdisciplinary coastal issues can
create bigger problems on the coast than existed in
the first place. In considering the problems that have
evolved in Wells and Saco, it is painful, but worthwhile,
to recall that they are all of our own making; we paid
to create coastal engineering structures just as surely
as we will pay for the damage they cause. Although
there are no easy solutions to the existing problems in
Wells and Saco, similar problems may be averted in the
future by thoughtful planning involving a variety of
disciplines beyond engineering. Challenged to achieve
consensus on the Camp Ellis and Wells disputes, it
is tempting to decide to let nature take its course.
Ultimately, however, a hands-off approach may be
the most costly of all options.
The difficulties at Camp Ellis and Wells are not
unique to our state; similar conflicts between local
coastal communities and the Corps of Engineers are
occurring all around the country (Pilkey and Dixon,
1996). However, Maine has relatively few sand beaches
and more private coastal land than other states
(Ringold and Clark, 1980), so the problem is relatively
large for us. A comparison of the economic value of
beaches versus harbors in southern Maine has never
been undertaken. Still, judging from the packed parking lots at marinas and coastal state parks, both boat

F

In considering

and beach recreation hold significant
economic value for Maine’s coastal
the problems
communities. It is similarly difficult to
assess the ecological value of our
southern coastal environments, but the
that have
relative lack of development of Maine’s
coastline compared to the coastlines of
evolved in Wells
southern New England and the Middle
Atlantic states greatly enhances the
value of a Maine coast that remains
and Saco, it is
relatively undeveloped. From both
economic and ecological reasons, then,
painful, but
Maine citizens have good reason to
concern themselves with beach and
harbor development issues. Maine has
worthwhile, to
led the nation in safeguarding beaches
through the “Sand Dune Law” (now
recall that they
incorporated into the Natural Resource
Protection Act, 38 M.S.R.A., sections
471-478), and in successfully resolving
are all of our
the Camp Ellis and Wells issues, which
could once again take a leadership role
own making.
in addressing the place of harbors in
beach systems.
Action by the Maine Legislature,
however, will not completely resolve
the problem described below. Leadership from the
executive branch is essential to bringing state natural
resource agencies and local environmental groups to the
table. The congressional delegation will be needed to
ensure that federal agencies participate. Legal, economic
and scientific expertise, from government employees,
university faculty and private companies will be essential to any sound solution. Finally, the Maine public,
who are the major beneficiaries of sound beaches and
well-sited harbors, must take a long-term interest in the
coast. Although it is understandable that the public may
take for granted Maine’s beautiful coastline, the price
to be paid by Maine citizens for neglecting to become
involved in this issue will be to have the future use of
this region determined by a small number of special
interest groups.
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BEACH DYNAMICS

hrough decades of observations coastal geologists
have learned that human construction activity, in
any place in the beach system, profoundly alters the
overall system. Beaches are deposits of sand (and gravel) formed by waves (Figure 1). Sand may come from
a river or from erosion of an older deposit of material
left from the Ice Age (Figure 1, areas 1 and 6), but
waves are required to move the sand. Waves are created
by wind and generally come from the direction the
wind blows. As waves enter shallow water, they reorient
themselves in important ways to accommodate the
shoaling conditions. Thus, predicting the precise movement of beach sand requires accurate predictions of
wind direction and velocity, and complete understand-

T

Figure 1:
Natural environments of a beach system include the subaerial beach (berm, 4a, b),
the submarine beach, (shoreface, 5a, b, c), the dunes (3a, b), and the tidal inlets and
their deltas (2a, b, c), as well as such sand sources as rivers (1a, b, c) and bluffs (6).
Each of these environments (2, 3, 4, 5) is connected to the others through an
exchange of sand. If one environment is altered or removed, the others are affected
(modified from Kelley, 1995).

ing of water depths offshore. Because winds and waves
are greatest in storms, prediction of beach erosion or
growth requires predictions of storm frequency and
intensity that are presently beyond our capability.
Computer-based numerical models of beach behavior,
though interesting as research tools, do not yet have
the capacity to forecast changes in our beaches (Thieler
et al., 2000).
Beach systems have several components that interact. The offshore part of the beach, the shoreface
(Figure 1, area 5), starts where waves first begin to
move sand, often in more than one hundred feet of
water for large storm waves. The berm (Figure 1, area
4), where we put our beach blankets, and the intertidal
zone are the familiar parts of the beach where we most
commonly recreate. Sand in these areas is moved by
waves in an onshore direction when the beach grows,
or in an offshore direction when the beach erodes. The
waves may approach a coast at an angle and move sand
along the beach. Wind blows sand from the berm into
the sand dunes (Figure 1, area 3), which serve to stockpile sand between large, infrequent storms. Finally, sand
may reach the end of a beach and be drawn by tidal
currents into a tidal inlet or delta (Figure 1, area 2).
Following its introduction to the sea, sand moves
between the offshore, berm, dunes and tidal delta of a
beach system in response to the wide variety of wave,
wind and tidal processes that a coast experiences annually. The entire beach system responds to alteration of
any of the components, sometimes rapidly, sometimes
slowly. Thus, if we dig a hole in the beach where
waves are active, the hole is quickly filled. The response
of the beach system to removal of a tidal delta
through dredging, or the response of the beach to
construction of a jetty (a rock wall built perpendicular
to the beach), is relatively slower and more complex.
Because of the complexity of the system, and the lack
of predictability of weather and waves, we cannot
accurately predict the long-term consequences of our
large-scale actions on beaches.

Camp Ellis, Saco, Maine
The Saco River begins in the White Mountains
and enters Saco Bay as one of the largest rivers in the
region. Saco Bay hosts both the largest beach and
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salt marsh system in the state of Maine (Kelley et al.,
1989). Camp Ellis is a small, recreational and fishing
community at the mouth of the Saco River, on the
southern end of Saco Bay (Figure 2).
Long before there was a Camp Ellis, all of the
earliest European visitors to Saco Bay complained of
the difficulty of navigating past the tidal deltas at the
mouth of the Saco River (Figure 3b). The problem
became more acute in the mid-19th century as the
mills in Biddeford and Saco sought to export goods
and import coal. In 1866, the United States Army
Corps of Engineers (USACOE) was asked to improve
river navigation, which they did by removing shoals
and erecting a rock jetty on the north side of the river
mouth. Although the army initially recognized that
sand traveled down the Saco River (“The river…during
spring freshets carried large quantities of sand…(to)
just below Factory island…whereby the material was
deposited” (USACOE, 1886), they built a jetty, or rock
wall perpendicular to the beach, to block the movement
of beach sand which both entered and exited the river
mouth with the tides.
Following jetty construction, the beach at Camp
Ellis initially grew seaward. The sand added to the
beach was a combination of material dredged from the
river channel plus the wave-washed remains of its tidal
delta (Figure 3b). Although the beach grew for only a
brief period, the north jetty was extended repeatedly
to 1,280 meters in 1897, 1,768 meters in 1930, and
2,030 meters in 1938. A jetty also was built on the
south bank of the river mouth in 1890, and expanded
in stages to 1,463 meters. Each of the structures was
built low and, later was repeatedly raised; in 1969 the
north jetty was elevated to 5.2 meters for the first 259
meters from land, and the north wall of the structure
was made more reflective to waves by carefully re-orienting the stones. Each change in the jetties required
a study to determine its need and to determine whether
the cost of the activity was justified by the benefit
(benefit/cost ratio). New constructions require the
benefit/cost ratio to equal or exceed 1.0.
The purpose of this last action, and the intent
of all the additions to each jetty, was to keep sand out
of the navigational channel, which continued to fill following each dredge event. The army, although lacking

observational data, had determined that there was “a
constant movement of sand from north to south along
the ocean beach...which has deposited material in front
of the original entrance channel” (USACOE, 1910).
Later, again without benefit of any study, the army
inferred that “the beach material is of glacial deposit
origin…due to the topography of the coast, there is
apparently no natural source of material other than
Figure 2:
Location map of Camp Ellis in Saco Bay, and historical dislocation of sand resulting
from construction of the Saco River jetties. The checkerboard pattern on Pine
Point indicates a region of new beach (after Barber, 1995; Kelley et al., 1995).
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by local erosion within the confines of Saco Bay”
(USACOE, 1955). These observations by the army
spawned a theory that an unseen deposit of Ice Age
material was eroding beneath Saco Bay and relentlessly
pouring sand onto Old Orchard Beach, from whence it
was moved by waves and currents to the south and into
Figure 3:
A) 1871 map of Pine Point region. Note that the Little River inlet is now closed and
the Scarborough River inlet is 550 meters narrower today; B) 1866 map of Saco River
mouth. Note the large sandy tidal delta that is gone today (after Kelley et al., 1995).
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the navigation channel. All enlargements and additions
to the jetties were predicated on this theory—the
assumption that sand was coming from the north and
moving either through the jetty, or out along it and
into the channel. Despite numerous objections by geologists, this theory was never examined by the army
with direct observations in Saco Bay.
Although sand continued to clog the navigation
channel at a regular rate, Camp Ellis beach ceased to
grow seaward shortly after the turn of the nineteenth
century. Many houses and roads were claimed by the
sea at considerable cost to both public and private sectors. All later USACOE studies of beach erosion at the
mouth of the Saco River (1920, 1939, 1955, 1961,
1969, 1976, 1987) denied a harmful influence of
the jetty on the adjacent eroding beach, and invoked
storms as the cause of that problem. In a 1992 report,
however, the army, for the first time, acknowledged
that “a lack of natural nourishment material (i.e., sand)
in the area” (USACOE, 1992) was compounding the
problem at Camp Ellis. Although some of the early
USACOE reports discerned a correlation between
lengthening and raising the jetty and beach erosion,
the 1992 report found “no conclusive links…between
construction of the navigation project and shoreline
changes” (USACOE, 1992).
By the 1990s, complaints of erosion by Camp
Ellis property owners had increased in number. In
1991, in response to these complaints, the Maine
Geological Survey, in cooperation with the University
of Maine and Boston University, initiated a study of
Saco Bay. Sponsored by the Maine-New Hampshire
Sea Grant Program (Barber, 1995; Kelley et al., 1995),
the study concluded that there was no source of sand
within Saco Bay, and that sand for the beach was
derived from the river on annual floods. An estimated
10,000 to 16,000 cubic meters of sand per year washes down the Saco, enough to account for the 8,500
cubic meters per year that historically has been dredged
from the harbor (Normandeau Associates, 1994). Far
from keeping beach sand out of the harbor at Camp
Ellis, lengthening the jetty may trap river-bourne material in the harbor. Other sand coming down the river
goes to sea more than a mile seaward of Camp Ellis.
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When confronted with these objections, along
with renewed complaints by Camp Ellis residents for
action, the army finally proposed a $500,000 physical
model study at Waterways Experimental Station in
Mississippi. Here, a football field-sized, scaled-down
model of Camp Ellis was constructed to “answer the
question” of the army’s role in Camp Ellis erosion, and
to propose solutions. Significantly, the concrete model
lacked a river to bring in sand, and no information
on waves and storms in Saco Bay were collected to
develop it. When it was suggested by the Maine
Geological Survey that instead of a physical model,
spoils being dredged from the anchorage and placed
on Camp Ellis should be monitored to understand the
Figure 4:
Shoreline change at Pine Point, 1877-1991. A) The photo shows shoreline positions from historic maps. All of this newly developed land was added to Pine
Point as a result of beach erosion at Camp Ellis. B) The beach profiles show that
the beach continued to grow between 1976 and 1991 (after Kelley et al., 1995).
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Contrary to the army’s contention, sand generally
travels to the north from the river (Figure 2). Local
people knew this from watching the dredged material
placed on Camp Ellis beach migrate to the north and
block Goosefare Brook. Using documents from the
army, scientists became convinced that north was the
net direction of sand. In the appendices of a 1955
study of beach erosion at Camp Ellis, the Corps estimated that between 1859 and 1955, almost six million
cubic meters of sand disappeared from Camp Ellis
beach and shallow offshore, or 61,933 cubic meters
per year during that time interval (Figures 2, 4, 5).
Although the army never questioned where this extraordinary volume of sand went, historic maps revealed
what happened. The introduction of a large volume
of sand between 1871 and 1877 closed the Little
River tidal inlet on the Scarborough-Old Orchard border (Figure 2). By 1955, so much sand had transferred
from the Camp Ellis area to Pine Point that the
Scarborough River inlet narrowed from 762 meters to
207 meters (Farrell, 1972) (Figure 4). As a result, the
army proposed constructing a jetty at the Scarborough
River inlet to keep it open. In more than a century of
working at Camp Ellis, the army has never associated
their activities at one end of the bay with their work
at the other end. Indeed, when the Maine Geological
Survey repeatedly suggested that sand from the planned
dredge of the Scarborough River be barged back to
Camp Ellis, the army initially resisted, citing cost as a
prohibitive factor.
To resolve the chronic erosion and property loss
problem and to maintain a viable anchorage at Camp
Ellis, representatives of the state met with representatives from the city of Saco, the Federal Emergency
Management Agency and the army to consider a buyout of houses in imminent danger of collapse. The
Corps refused to participate in discussion of a buyout,
prompting a letter from Governor McKernan. “I think
it is inappropriate for the Corps to walk away from this
problem,” wrote Governor McKernan (letter from Gov.
McKernan to Lt. General Hatch, 5-28-92), “particularly
in light of the impact of the navigation project on the
adjacent shoreline.”

B

Shore-normal Distance (m)
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Figure 5:
Shoreline change at Camp Ellis between 1953 and 1991. A) The photo shows
shoreline positions from historic aerial photographs. The area of apparent beach
growth is a location where a rock seawall was built seaward of Surf St.
B) The beach profiles show that erosion continued between 1976 to 1991
(from Kelley et al., 1995).

Wells Harbor and Wells and
Drakes Island Beaches, Wells, Maine
Wells Beach and Drakes Island are relatively large
beaches separated by the Webhannet River tidal inlet
(Figure 6). Because the Webhannet River has a very
small discharge and its estuary is choked with salt
marshes and tidal flats, the inlet has always been shallow (Figure 7). On flooding tides, water—carrying
sand from both beaches—used to accelerate through
the narrow inlet, and slow down upon entering the
estuary behind the beaches. Here, sand was deposited,
which formed a flood-tidal delta. On the seaward side
of the inlet an ebb-tidal delta existed as well (Figure 7).
All of the sand on the beaches, including the submerged part of the beaches out to a 30-meter water
depth, was in a balance or equilibrium with the tidal
delta sands. During storms, sand might be swept from
the beaches and enlarge the tidal delta for a time, but
it would return when “normal” conditions ensued again.
Sand freely moved from the offshore, submerged part
of the beach, to beach and dune, to inlet, depending
on conditions.
For centuries people lived in Wells and used the
estuary as a harbor (as well as a source of salt hay,

Relative Elevation (m)

A

B

direction and rate of sand movement during storms,
the army declined, noting “it is quite possible that no
significant storm events will occur (during the year
of measurement)” (Col. Miller to Mr. Philip Donovon,
letter of 9-24-93).
In April of 1995, the Army presented the results
of their physical model study to the public at a hearing
in Saco. The only solution they developed which
would protect both property and the navigation channel was a 914 meters long, 4.5 meters high rock
breakwater parallel to the beach in three meters of
water. However, the cost was estimated at $14 million,
which yielded only a 0.2 benefit/cost ratio. This ratio
was too low to permit federal construction of the
breakwater, which is prohibited by Maine law in any
case because of the damage it would cause on adjacent
beaches to the north. A member of the public then
asked the army if that was the end of the whole study
and was told, “That’s about it” (Mr. Paul Provonost,
Deputy Director of Planning, New England Division).

Shore-normal Distance (m)
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Figure 6:

shellfish and fish, and waterfowl), but could only enter
or exit the inlet at high tide. Similarly, the beaches were
either used to repair boats or for vacation visits, but
no permanent structures existed in the dunes. However,
around the turn of the nineteenth century, changes
began to occur. By the end of World War II, houses
were built on top of almost all the most seaward sand
dunes. As fishing boats became larger—with deeper
drafts—to haul more lobster traps or to travel farther
to catch fish, people began to clamor for an expanded
anchorage and an “improved” inlet.
In 1953 the town requested that the United States
Army Corps of Engineers create a small boat anchorage (partly for safety reasons) and, at the same time,
reconstruct the seawalls that were collapsing onto the
beaches (USACOE, 1994). Although the army could
not do work on the private seawalls near the inlet, on
the basis of a benefit/cost ratio of 1.0, they agreed by
1961 to construct an anchorage.
Work began with the construction of rock jetties
145 meters apart at the end of Drakes Island and Wells
Beach. The purpose of the jetties, 200 meters long on
Drakes Island and 290 meters on Wells Beach, was to
prevent sand from moving into the navigation channel
from the beaches. During jetty construction, a northeaster eroded the northern tip of Wells Beach, requiring the placement of rocks to prevent further erosion
by 1963. The army also determined that it was necessary to extend the north jetty sixty meters to prevent
waves from entering the channel.
Initial dredging began in July 1962, but progress
was slow due to rapid shoaling in the navigation channel and anchorage, frequent mechanical breakdowns and
occasional storms. By November 1963, the project was
stopped when the dredger left without completing the
work to the army’s design specifications (Byrne and
Ziegler, 1977). A second attempt to dredge the project
began in August 1964, but ended in May 1965 when the
dredger quit because of rapid shoaling and equipment
losses (Byrne and Ziegler, 1977). To fix this situation,
between 1965 and 1967, the army: 1) extended the
north jetty 373 meters; 2) extended the south jetty 396
meters; 3) dug a 91 meters by 122 meters by 3 meters
basin south of the anchorage to collect material eroding
from the salt marsh; and 4) re-dredged the entire project.

Map of Wells, showing historic shoreline positions. Sand accumulated near the
jetties following their construction (after Kelley et al., 1989).

Figure 7:
Aerial photograph of Wells Inlet in 1953. Note the narrow low-tide channel
prior to dredging, and the large quantity of sand in the flood and ebb tidal
deltas on the landward and seaward sides of the inlet, respectively.

Fall 2000 · MAINE POLICY REVIEW · 27

A TALE OF TWO HARBORS

Nevertheless, shoaling continued relentlessly, and
the project was dredged in 1970, 1971 and finally in
1974. More than 382,000 cubic meters were dredged
from the project, with virtually all of it dumped on the
adjacent salt marsh (USACOE, 1994) (Figure 8),
removing it from the sand beach system (Figure 1).
By 1980, it was clear that things were not going as
planned. Rather than fill in at the anticipated rate of
3,057 cubic meters per year, the anchorage filled at a
rate of 15,286 cubic meters per year; rather than the
186 moorings secured in 1974, now, in 1980, there
was only space for forty vessels (USACOE, 1980;
Humm, 1985). Despite realignment, the jetties still
faced directly into the prevailing waves, bringing sand
into the anchorage and making boat passage through
the jetties hazardous. No discussion of how these
Figure 8:
Aerial photograph of Wells during 1974 dredging operation (after Kelley et al., 1989).
The dredge spoils pile is in the foreground. As much of this sand as possible should
go back to the beach.
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events altered the original benefit/cost ratio was apparently undertaken because the harbor no longer represented the most pressing problem. Now, attention was
focused on the eroding beaches (Figure 9).
Since the first day the jetties blocked the free passage of beach sand into and out of the tidal inlet, sand
began to collect adjacent to the jetties (Figure 6). Waves
and currents drove the sand next to the jetties, but the
shadow effect of the structures prevented waves from
other directions from returning sand to the ends of the
beaches. Wind blew the deposited sand into high dunes,
trapping more than 76,430 cubic meters of sand
(Figure 6). Loss of their beaches angered the beachfront property owners and led to a cessation of dredging after 1974. By 1980, the New England Environmental Mediation Center was brought in to help
resolve the dispute between the army, one faction within the town wanting a dredged harbor, and another
desiring a return of the lost beach sand (Humm, 1985).
Almost a decade of inaction ensued before a proposal to again attempt to dredge the harbor emerged
in the late 1980s. However, this effort proposed to
place the sand on the beach instead of the salt marsh.
However, times and laws had changed, the salt marsh,
formerly a dump for dredged material, was now the
Rachel Carson Wildlife Refuge and governed by several
agencies. Federal, state and private organizations
opposed renewed dredging because of its destructive
impact on the marsh. Salt marsh peat erodes into the
deep anchorage when it is dredged. After unanimous
denials for a permit to dredge the harbor from the State
Board of Environmental Protection, the Maine State
Legislature also refused to alter the law to accommodate a dredge.
The town regrouped by 1994, and sought only to
move the sand next to the jetties back along the beach.
However, this sand was now incorporated into wellvegetated dunes and protected from removal by the
state’s Natural Resource Protection Act. Furthermore,
similar to the sand that moved from Camp Ellis to
build up Pine Point, the sand next to the jetties at Wells
was claimed by new owners as private property and
partly developed. Its “owners” expressed disapproval
with the potential loss of their sand, even if it could
temporarily save their neighbors.

A TALE OF TWO HARBORS

Faced with owning a harbor or a beach, Wells
spokespersons began to indicate they would prefer a
beach, and have discussed asking the army to remove
the jetties and let the sand be redistributed along the
beach by waves. In response to all the local outcries,
the army commissioned a study that reached one conclusion (among others) that stated, “A hydraulic model
study is required for the determination the optimum
(sic) jetty configuration to reduce inlet shoaling and
beach erosion” (USACOE, 1994). One study concludes
that more studies are needed. The history of Wells
begins to appear disturbingly similar to Camp Ellis at
an earlier stage.
RECENT ACTIONS

esponding, in part, to the problems at Camp Ellis
and Wells Harbor, the state sponsored a series of
“stakeholder” meetings where citizen groups could
discuss beach problems with state agencies (Maine State
Planning Office, 1998). The problem at Camp Ellis
was an important focus of that group because it is
assumed that the area will be lost if nothing is done
(Marine Law Institute et al., 1994). One result of this
effort was the creation of a Saco Bay Beach
Management Committee, which identified erosion at
Camp Ellis as a high priority. A major difficulty this
committee or any state or local group faces when considering action at Camp Ellis, is that federal action is
required to alter the jetty.
In Wells, the state brokered a compromise among
organizations in favor of and opposed to the dredging
of the harbor. With participation from the army, a plan
was developed that will allow a reduced dredge to
occur in 2000-2001, with the sandy dredge spoils
placed on the adjacent beaches. Monitoring of the
tidal delta and adjacent marshes will then determine
if further dredging can occur. While this addresses the
immediate need of a dredged harbor and sandy beaches, it is probable that the harbor will fill very quickly
and that the new beach sand will move near the jetties
as it did in the past (Figure 6). Most observers agree
this is only a short-term solution.

DISCUSSION

n both Wells and Camp Ellis, the army was brought
in to construct a harbor at no local cost to a community. Initially the army resisted, citing high costs and
low benefits, but later began construction when (presumably) more benefits were discovered or political
pressure mounted. In each case, engineering problems
were addressed with engineering solutions; one technical study followed and often repeated its predecessors.
Beach erosion, a non-issue in the beginning, began to
drive all discussion around the harbors. The technical
resolution of the problems will require more than engineering expertise. A major concerted effort on the part
of federal, as well as Maine state, university and private
organizations is called for.

I

R

Figure 9:
A 1997 photograph of Wells Beach,Wells, which shows the lack of sand in
this beach system today. At high tide there is little or no recreational beach.
The large rocks were added to prevent the seawall from becoming undermined, owing to a lack of sand.
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PURELY ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS

n a state renowned for its natural, deep-draft harbors,
we have unsuccessfully expended enormous effort to
turn two tidal deltas into anchorages. In the case of
Camp Ellis, this was possibly justified initially because
of the commerce associated with industries in
Biddeford and Saco. In Wells, the harbor was constructed largely for recreational boating, with commercial
fishing vessels comprising only 10% of the fleet (U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers, 1997). However, despite
significant changes in the local economic situation, no
reanalyses have occurred. This is particularly distressing
in light of the unanticipated loss of a large number of
properties and beach area at Camp Ellis. In the case of
Wells no serious reconsideration of the value of the
harbor has been undertaken despite the costly history
which followed an initial (almost miraculous)

I

ENVIRONMENTAL-ECONOMIC
CONSIDERATIONS

n both Wells and Camp Ellis, the true cost of the
harbors has involved more than simply the dollar
value invested in anchorages. In each instance there has
also been an environmental-economic cost. Some of
Maine’s greatest summer tourist attractions are its few
small, but beautiful, sandy ocean beaches. Camp Ellis,
Wells and Drakes Island beaches have been lost or
severely degraded because of the existence of nearby
harbors. How many tourist dollars never came to
Maine because of this? In addition, there have been
substantial private property losses ($1.5 million in federal flood insurance payments to Wells since 1978;
$1.1 million to Saco (L. Sidell, State Floodplain
Coordinator, personal communication, 11-94)), not to
mention the loss of the local property tax base and the
cost of repairing public roads. Although it
is difficult to place a dollar value on
In a state renowned for its natural, deep-draft harbors,
wildlife and its habitat; this too has been
sacrificed for harbors, but never factored
into their cost. What is truly alarming
we have unsuccessfully expended enormous effort to
with regard to all of these hidden costs to
the anchorages is that the beach erosion
turn two tidal deltas into anchorages.
continues to worsen. Relatively undeveloped beaches at least as far north of
Camp Ellis as Ferry Beach State Park, and
benefit/cost ratio of 1.0. Instead, to create benefits
as far north of Wells Inlet as Laudholm Beach State
equal to the incurred costs, “a projected rate of fleet
Park, are eroding, possibly as a result of the engineergrowth was factored into the analysis...This growth was
ing structures.
assumed to occur until a total fleet of small craft suffiROLE OF THE ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS
cient to justify the project would be reached in about
the year 2016” (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 1997).
t first one could easily conclude that the army is
Recently, even though it is extremely unlikely that
more a pawn than a protagonist in Wells and
Wells Harbor will experience the projected growth, the
Camp Ellis. After all, the army was invited into Maine
army announced that the dredging planned for 2000
to improve navigation. No one said anything to them
was going ahead despite a cost more than double the
about beaches or property; in fact, there was probably
previous estimate (Cohen, 2000).
little or no beach development at Camp Ellis in 1866.
If the cost of these projects was borne by private
However, the role of the Corps of Engineers has slowinterests, or even by the local communities themselves, it
ly evolved from one of providing federal assistance and
is probable that economic analyses would have been made
specialized expertise where requested to that of an
decades ago. Apparently since the costs are absorbed by
agency with a narrow focus on engineering solutions to
the federal government, no one has ever challenged the
geological, economic and environmental issues. The
projects on the basis of their economic value.
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repeated engineering failures at Camp Ellis might be
forgiven for nineteenth century ignorance if they did
not persist up to the present—and if they were not
almost duplicated once again at Wells.
For example, the army’s failure to consider the
Saco River as the source of sand to the bay’s beaches
could be ascribed to a general lack of understanding
of coastal processes in the 1800s—if such a misunderstanding did not persist in 1994. If one looks critically
at the army’s decision to erect a $500,000 concrete
facsimile of Camp Ellis in Mississippi, in lieu of monitoring the movement of dredged sand just placed on
Camp Ellis beach, one might reasonably suspect they
are covering up a century of ineptness with a study
whose conclusions can neither be replicated nor implemented by others.
As an organization, the army has exhibited a pattern of behavior that involves initial denial of responsibility, followed up (when political pressure is brought
to bear) by technical studies that repeat old, untested
assumptions and conclusions. As noted by former
Maine Department of Environmental Protection Commissioner Dean Marriott: “The recent Corps’ reports
present no new data; they simply re-examine earlier
Corps’ reports from a coastal engineering perspective.
Erroneous statements and conclusions made in earlier
reports are just passed from one study to the next, despite
the state’s, the city’s (Saco) and residents’ attempts to
have the Corps re-evaluate these conclusions” (letter
from Dean Marriott to Col. Harris, 5-21-92).
Historically, Corps’ studies result in either more
engineering attempts or still more studies until the generation of complaining property owners and their
political supporters are gone. Often, the army tries to
play off one set of opponents against another by blaming, for example, the state’s regulators for their unwillingness to help people. Governor McKernan wrote
with obvious frustration: “We have tried to work with
the New England Division (of the Corps of Engineers)
to find compromises…However, the Division has been
of little help in achieving these compromises on
numerous occasions. The Corps staff have made many
statements to municipalities, the press, legislators, and
others, that they want to help the municipalities and
carry out projects, but the Department of Environ-

mental Protection is preventing them from doing so. I
trust you can agree that it is not productive to have one
level of government criticizing and laying blame on
another” (letter from Governor McKernan to General
Hatch, 5-28-92).
Is it wishful thinking to expect a federal agency to
provide high-quality engineering expertise at little or
no local cost? Maybe there are few complaints about
the army because the federal expenditures seem free to
local interests. Imagine the reaction of a town to shoddy engineering work, like the design of the Wells’ jetties, if the town had to fully pay for the work out of
pocket. Think about how such a community would
react to a private company whose poor engineering not
only failed to do what it was supposed to, but whose
efforts caused the loss of valuable beaches, wetlands
and property. Needless to say that company would
cease to exist and private competition would provide
a new firm that would listen to local interests and
educate themselves on the causes of past failures.
CONCLUSIONS

Federal Considerations
At a national level, more public scrutiny of the
Army Corps of Engineers’ benefit/cost analyses is
required. Historic projects should be periodically reevaluated in light of both changing benefits and costs.
The benefits and costs of projects also should include
more than construction costs and navigation benefits.
Benefits and costs should also encompass the full
range of environmental impacts over an extended
period of time.
Finally, we need to re-think the role of a military
organization, governed by politicians with great pressure from special interest groups, in routine maintenance of our harbors. The army’s role in dredging
harbors and putting sand on beaches is rooted in nineteenth century history (Shallet, 1994), not in thoughtful governmental planning. Problems with army
projects exist all around the United States (Pilkey and
Dixon, 1996). Some observers have suggested that the
budget of the army for dredging harbors be transferred
to either the Department of Commerce or Department
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of Transportation. Other
observers suggest that since the
army acts largely as an agent
between states and dredging
companies, the army’s dredging
budget should be provided
directly to the states, leaving the
states to assume responsibility
for their own mistakes.

Regional Considerations
The regional beach management groups in Saco and
Wells serve as an important
mechanism to develop local
interest and support for action
on coastal problems. However,
these groups are ill equipped to
develop a plan that spans engineering, geology, economics,
wildlife biology, politics and
law. A panel, patterned after
National Academy of Sciences’
panels, and representing those
skills, needs to be convened
now to develop realistic plans
to deal with beaches and harbors in Wells and Saco. This
panel will need to develop a
technical and a political consensus before anything can happen
on the coast. Money will be needed to support such a
panel, probably hundreds of thousand of dollars. The
governor is the logical person to convene such a panel.
The panel might form the nucleus of a State Academy
of Sciences.
Once there is a plan, the congressional delegation
must be brought in to assist in implementing it. The
support of the delegation is essential because any alteration of federal anchorages requires, literally, an act of
Congress. Any successful plan will also require money,
probably more money than was used to build the
anchorages. Though large, the money spent repairing
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our coast is actually small compared to the value of the
properties on the coast and the tourism dollars beaches
attract. It is unlikely that the Corps of Engineers can
be left out of Maine’s plans. However, Maine must
make clear that the army’s involvement is limited to
doing the state’s bidding until the time comes when
they can be removed from civilian activities. Of course,
if past history is a guide to the future, then once
Congress appropriates funds for an Army Corps project
the army is in charge of the project. Yet little meaningful public or state involvement occurs under this process.
Simply put, turning things over to the Army Corps of
Engineers and then stepping back is not a solution.

Local Considerations
In no way should this essay be construed as simply
an effort to remove commercial anchorages in southern
Maine in favor of recreational beaches. This region
needs more anchorages, not fewer. The problem is that
the anchorages in Wells and Saco have had a major,
deleterious impact on the adjacent beaches because
of geological processes that are still poorly understood.
Similar impacts might be anticipated in Kennebunkport, York or Scarborough because jetties also abut
beaches there, but no such problems have yet been
reported. The important local questions to ask
are whether we need to: 1) alter the existing structures
to permit them to co-exist with healthy beaches;
2) accommodate the existing structures by adding sand
to the eroding beaches; or 3) choose between whether
we prefer a harbor or a beach because they cannot be
made to co-exist. The latter option leads to other considerations, such as where to locate a replacement harbor or how to deal with existing property.
In Camp Ellis, serious thought should be given to
altering the north jetty. It could be roughened and lowered on its seaward side to blunt its ability to reflect
waves toward Camp Ellis. In addition, sand from the
spring freshet of the Saco River might regularly be
diverted to Camp Ellis. Every decade when the
Scarborough River is dredged, its sand might be added
to Camp Ellis. These tasks require some funding, but
they are the least expensive options.
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In Wells, the least expensive option is an experiment in dredging the tidal inlet/delta (harbor) and
putting the sand on the beaches; this is planned to
begin in the winter of 2000. This activity will be
monitored and we will learn how long it takes for sand
to return to the harbor and whether the salt marsh is
compromised by the dredging. At the same time, sand
dumped on the salt marsh and adjacent to the jetties
(Figures 6, 8) might be returned to the beaches. It would
be expensive to move much sand from the marsh, but
the sand belongs on the beach and should be returned
to it. Sand adjacent to the jetties is of uncertain ownership, although some of the “new” land is developed
(just as the sand eroded from Camp Ellis is now developed on Pine Point). Ownership must be determined
here as well as the practicality of moving large volumes
of sand from one end of a beach to the other.
However, making minor structural modifications to
the jetties and transferring sand may not halt the erosion of the beaches. In the end, if the jetties threaten
the integrity of the beaches of Saco and Wells, a
choice must be made between the existing harbors and
beaches. The decision may appear simple; the beaches
are more valuable than dysfunctional harbors located
on tidal deltas. However, the cost of removing the jetties will be substantial, resulting in the loss of considerable commercial infrastructure. Commercial fishing
interests will have great difficulty gaining entry to a
new port along such a busy stretch of coast. Clearly,
new harbor sites will need to be selected. Obtaining
money to fund the removal of the jetties and locate
new harbor sites will not be an easy task.
The final alternative, to “do nothing,” is the present course of action. On sunny days in the summer,
with boats in the harbor and people on the beach, it is
easy to favor the status quo. Still, the beaches are eroding and year-by-year the problem worsens. The level of
the ocean is rising faster than it has in millennia and is
unlikely to stop (Kelley et al., 1996). The problem will
never correct itself without significant economic loss.
Ultimately, we may have to decide between these two
choices: investing effort and resources into finding
solutions to our coastal problems, or opting to merely
absorb the costs of letting nature run its course. 
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